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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Zenaido Renteria was involved in a drug 
trafficking conspiracy that conducted business in Pennsylvania 
and California.  He was convicted at trial in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania of one count of conspiracy to distribute 500 
grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more 
of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  He was sentenced to 
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153 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised 
release. 
  
 Renteria now appeals, arguing that the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania was not a proper venue for his case because it 
was not reasonably foreseeable to him that conduct in 
furtherance of the conspiracy would have occurred there. He 
also claims that the District Court gave incorrect jury 
instructions and that the District Court erred in its calculation 
of his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”).  Because we choose not to adopt a “reasonable 
foreseeability” test for venue, we conclude that the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania was an appropriate venue for 
Renteria’s case.  We also conclude that the District Court’s jury 
instructions were proper and that it did not err in its Guidelines 
calculation.  Accordingly, we will affirm in all respects. 
 
I. 
 
A. The Investigation 
 
In May 2015, Homeland Security Investigations Special 
Agent Jeffrey Kuc posed undercover as a methamphetamine 
and heroin trafficker in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In this role, 
Kuc communicated over the phone with two men, known to 
him as Cejas and Juan, who used telephone numbers with 
Mexican country codes.  From his location in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Kuc arranged for Cejas and Juan to 
send two kilograms of methamphetamine to a mailbox in 
Springfield, Pennsylvania.  The men agreed that Kuc would 
pay $30,000 for the drugs.  They also agreed that after he 
received the methamphetamine, Kuc would deposit $2,000 into 
a bank account provided by Cejas.  Kuc would then pay the 
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remaining $28,000 in cash when he traveled to California 
shortly thereafter to purchase heroin and more 
methamphetamine.  
 
Kuc received the methamphetamine shipment on May 
29, 2015, and he deposited $2,000 in an agreed-upon bank 
account the following day in Philadelphia.   On June 3, 2015, 
Kuc traveled to Los Angeles and spoke to Cejas, who informed 
him that he would direct his contact in the area to reach out to 
Kuc.  
 
Later that day, Kuc received a phone call from Renteria.  
After some negotiating, the two men formulated a plan to 
exchange methamphetamine and heroin for $146,500—the 
value of the new drugs Kuc would receive plus the $28,000 he 
owed for the prior Pennsylvania methamphetamine shipment.  
The next day, the men discussed a meeting time, and Renteria 
expressed that he was rushing to prepare for the transaction, 
explaining, “they just told me this yesterday.”1  Later, the men 
met at a fast food restaurant in Huntington Beach, California.  
There, after Kuc saw the drugs and gave other agents a pre-
arranged signal, Renteria was arrested. 
 
B. District Court Proceedings 
 
 Within a week of Renteria’s arrest, a grand jury 
convened in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a 
two-count indictment that charged him with conspiracy to 
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and one 
kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 
(“count one”) and possession with intent to distribute 500 
                                              
1 App. at 262.  
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grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more 
of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (“count two”).  
 
 Renteria, a California resident, filed a Motion to Change 
Venue requesting that his case be transferred to California, but 
the Motion was denied by the District Court.2  He then moved 
to dismiss both counts one and two for lack of venue.  The 
Government conceded that count two should be dismissed, but 
the District Court denied the motion with respect to count one.  
 Renteria proceeded to trial on count one in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. At trial, the District Court instructed 
the jury regarding venue, explaining in part: 
 
The government does not need to prove that the 
defendant himself was present in this district, 
instead [venue] can be established in this district 
if a co-conspirator has committed an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy here even if the 
defendant did not know or did not reasonably 
foresee that the act occurred or would occur in 
this district.3 
 
 Renteria was convicted.  Prior to sentencing, the 
Probation Office calculated Renteria’s Guidelines range to be 
151 to 188 months of imprisonment.  In calculating the 
Guidelines range, the Probation Office determined Renteria’s 
offense level by considering the quantities of heroin and 
                                              
2 Renteria is not appealing the denial of his Motion to Change 
Venue because, as he admits in his briefing, the Motion did not 
include the proper law or relevant facts. 
3 Id. at 155. 
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methamphetamine that Renteria attempted to deliver to Kuc in 
California, as well as the quantity of methamphetamine 
shipped to Kuc in Springfield, Pennsylvania.  Ultimately, after 
accounting for Renteria’s minor role in the conspiracy, the 
Probation Office determined that Renteria had a total offense 
level of 34 and was in criminal history category I.  
 
 At Renteria’s sentencing hearing, the District Court 
adopted the Probation Office’s Guidelines calculation and 
explained that the applicable Guidelines range was 151 to 188 
months of imprisonment.  Neither side objected, although the 
Government contended that a reduction for being a minor 
participant should not be given.  The District Court imposed a 
sentence of 153 months’ imprisonment and five years’ 
supervised release.  Soon thereafter, Renteria appealed.4 
 
II. 
 
We will address each of Renteria’s three issues on 
appeal in turn, beginning with venue.5  Although Renteria 
urges us to adopt a reasonable foreseeability test to analyze 
venue in conspiracy cases, we decline to do so.  
 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
5 Our review of the District Court’s decision regarding venue 
is plenary.  United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 
(3d Cir. 2014).  The Government must prove that venue is 
proper by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 533.  
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Venue is a concept that stems from the Constitution 
itself, which “twice safeguards the defendant’s venue right.”6  
First, Article III mandates that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . .  
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed.”7  Second, the Sixth Amendment reiterates, “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”8  The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporate the 
Constitution’s conception of venue in Rule 18, which explains 
that the Government “must prosecute an offense in a district 
where the offense was committed.”9 
 
As we have previously explained, “Congress may 
prescribe specific venue requirements for particular crimes.”10  
In that vein, in 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), Congress provided that 
continuing offenses, including conspiracy, can be “prosecuted 
in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed.”11  We have further clarified that “[i]n addition, 
venue can be established wherever a co-conspirator has 
committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”12 
 
It is in this legal landscape that Renteria argues that 
venue was not properly laid in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in his case.  On a broad level, Renteria urges us 
                                              
6 United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998).  
7 U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 3. 
8 Id. amend. VI.  
9 Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. 
10 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 532. 
11 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2012).  
12 United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 329 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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to conclude that in order to establish venue in a particular 
district in a conspiracy case under § 3237(a), it must have been 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy would have occurred in the 
district.  He claims that adopting such a reasonable 
foreseeability test is required by the Constitution. 
  
Assuming that we adopt a reasonable foreseeability test, 
Renteria contends that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was 
not a proper venue because “it was not reasonably foreseeable 
to [him] that an act in furtherance of the conspiracy would be 
committed [there].”13  He asserts that he could not have 
foreseen the events that took place in Pennsylvania because he 
did not join the conspiracy until June 3, 2015—after his co-
conspirators had directed phone calls and shipped 
methamphetamine to Kuc in Pennsylvania—and because all of 
his actions occurred in California.  
 
Whether to adopt a reasonable foreseeability test to 
determine if venue has been laid properly in a conspiracy case 
under § 3237(a) is an issue of first impression for our Court.  
Although the Second Circuit has concluded that a reasonable 
foreseeability test is required to establish venue,14 the Ninth 
Circuit has rejected the test in the context of § 3237(a),15 and 
the Fourth Circuit has rejected it in the context of a similar 
                                              
13 Appellant’s Br. at 13.  
14 United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 483 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(adopting a reasonable foreseeability test). 
15 United States v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“Simply put, section 3237(a) does not require 
foreseeability to establish venue for a continuous offense.”). 
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venue statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.16  We now decline to adopt a 
reasonable foreseeability test as well. 
 
  To begin, we conclude that we need not adopt a 
reasonable foreseeability test because neither the text of the 
Constitution nor of § 3237(a) requires it.  In fact, the 
Constitution and § 3237(a) focus solely on where the offense 
occurred and do not even reference foreseeability.17  As the 
Fourth Circuit explained in United States v. Johnson, albeit in 
connection with the venue statute for securities offenses,18 “[i]f 
Congress had wanted to limit venue to those districts where the 
defendant could have reasonably foreseen [the] criminal 
conduct taking place, it could have easily done so. Instead, it 
enacted a broad venue provision, one that lacked any reference 
to a defendant’s mental state or predictive calculus.”19 
 
 Just as we conclude that the Constitution and § 3237(a) 
do not explicitly provide for a reasonable foreseeability 
                                              
16 United States v. Johnson, 510 F.3d 521, 527 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting a reasonable foreseeability test in the context of 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa, the venue statute for securities offenses).  We 
also note that the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt a reasonable 
foreseeability test to establish venue under § 3237(a) in an 
unpublished opinion.  United States v. Castaneda, 315 F. 
App’x 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2009) (“We decline to adopt 
foreseeability as an additional element of venue at this time.”).  
17 See U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 
3237(a).  
18 15 U.S.C. § 78aa provides that for securities offenses, “[a]ny 
criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any 
act or transaction constituting the violation occurred.” 
19 Johnson, 510 F.3d at 527.  
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requirement, we also choose not to imply one.  As we have 
previously explained, venue is “an element more akin to 
jurisdiction than to the substantive elements of the crime,”20 
and “mens rea requirements typically do not extend to the 
jurisdictional elements of a crime.”21 Like the Ninth Circuit in 
rejecting a reasonable foreseeability test in United States v. 
Gonzalez, we see no reason to diverge from these principles 
here.22  
 
In addition, the fact that the Second Circuit has adopted 
a reasonable foreseeability requirement to establish venue does 
not persuade us that we should do so.   In United States v. 
Svoboda,23 the Second Circuit examined two cases, United 
States v. Kim24 and United States v. Bezmalinovic,25 and 
concluded that such cases demonstrate that “venue is proper in 
                                              
20 Perez, 280 F.3d at 330 (quoting United States v. Massa, 686 
F.2d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1982)).  
21 United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 664 (4th Cir. 
2007)).  
22 Gonzalez, 683 F.3d at 1226 (“[V]enue is similar in nature to 
a jurisdictional element, and typically lacks any sort of explicit 
knowledge or foreseeability prerequisite.” (quoting Johnson, 
510 F.3d at 527)).  See also Johnson, 510 F.3d at 527 (“We are 
especially reluctant to imply a foreseeability requirement in 
light of the fact that it ‘is well settled that mens rea 
requirements typically do not extend to the jurisdictional 
elements of a crime.’” (quoting United States v. Cooper, 482 
F.3d 658, 664 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
23 347 F.3d 471.  
24 246 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2001).  
25 962 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  
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a district where (1) the defendant intentionally or knowingly 
causes an act in furtherance of the charged offense to occur in 
the district of venue or (2) it is foreseeable that such an act 
would occur in the district of venue.”26  Significantly, however, 
neither Svoboda nor Kim nor Bezmalinovic actually explains 
why reasonable foreseeability is required to establish venue 
under the Constitution.  Rather, the cases seem to derive the 
reasonable foreseeability test from a generous reading of prior 
Second Circuit precedent.27  In fact, even the Second Circuit 
itself has recently acknowledged that “[o]ther Circuits have not 
adopted such a requirement” and admitted that Svoboda, its 
“seminal case” on the issue, “identified a foreseeability 
requirement without extensive analysis.”28  Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit’s opinions do not persuade us to adopt a 
reasonable foreseeability test. 
 
We are also not convinced by Renteria’s argument that 
a reasonable foreseeability test is necessary to comply with the 
Constitution’s venue provisions because it promotes the policy 
behind them—protecting “against the unfairness and hardship 
involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place.”29  
“[U]nfairness is generally not a concern when a defendant is 
tried in a district ‘wherein the crime shall have been 
                                              
26 Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 483.  
27 See Bezmalinovic, 962 F. Supp. at 438-41; Kim, 246 F.3d at 
193.  
28 United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 
2018).  
29 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 540 (quoting United States v. 
Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958)). 
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committed.’”30  Thus, because § 3237(a) limits venue to “any 
district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed,” it is unnecessary for us to adopt a reasonable 
foreseeability test to protect the accused.31  Furthermore, 
defendants who wish to be prosecuted in a venue other than the 
one the Government has chosen can file a motion to transfer 
venue under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which provides for transfers for both prejudice and 
convenience.32  This further convinces us that we need not 
adopt a reasonable foreseeability test to ensure that defendants 
are not being prosecuted in venues that are unfair to them.33  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt a 
reasonable foreseeability requirement to establish venue in 
conspiracy cases under § 3237(a).  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was a proper venue 
for Renteria’s case. Although Renteria himself did not act in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or direct any of his actions 
                                              
30 United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) 
32 Fed. R. Crim. P. 21. As discussed above, Renteria filed a 
motion under Rule 21(b), but the District Court denied it 
because it was not sufficiently supported by law and facts.  He 
does not appeal the denial here. See supra note 16. 
33 We also reject Renteria’s argument that a reasonable 
foreseeability test should be adopted to create consistency with 
the principles of co-conspirator liability set forth in Pinkerton 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).  In short, venue, an 
element more akin to jurisdiction than anything else, see supra 
p. 9, and co-conspirator liability are significantly different 
concepts that do not necessitate the same law.  
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there, his co-conspirators sent methamphetamine to Kuc there 
and directed phone calls to him there.34  These activities 
constitute overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy that are 
certainly sufficient to establish venue under § 3237(a).35 
 
III. 
 
 We now turn to Renteria’s challenge to the District 
Court’s jury instructions.  As discussed above, the District 
Court instructed the jury in relevant part: 
 
The government does not need to prove that the 
defendant himself was present in this district, 
instead [venue] can be established in this district 
if a co-conspirator has committed an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy here even if the 
defendant did not know or did not reasonably 
foresee that the act occurred or would occur in 
this district.36 
 
                                              
34 See Perez, 280 F.3d at 329 (“[V]enue can be established 
wherever a co-conspirator has committed an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”).  
35 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 683 F.3d at 1225 (explaining that a 
confidential informant’s presence in the Northern District of 
California during telephone calls with a co-conspirator 
“sufficed to establish venue there on the conspiracy charge”); 
United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(concluding that venue was appropriate in Puerto Rico when 
an undercover law enforcement agent was located there and 
spoke to the conspirators on the phone there).  
36 App. at 155. 
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Renteria’s only argument regarding the jury instructions is that 
the District Court should not have instructed the jury that venue 
could be laid “even if the defendant did not know or did not 
reasonably foresee that [an act in furtherance of the conspiracy] 
occurred or would occur in this district.”37 
 
Because we do not adopt a reasonable foreseeability test 
for venue under § 3237(a), we conclude that the District 
Court’s jury instructions were proper.  
 
   IV. 
 
Lastly, we will address Renteria’s appeal of his 
sentence. As mentioned above, before Renteria’s sentencing 
hearing, the Probation Office calculated Renteria’s Guidelines 
range and included the drugs Renteria’s co-conspirators sent to 
Kuc in Pennsylvania as part of the calculation.  At sentencing, 
the District Court adopted the Probation Office’s Presentence 
Report without objection from Renteria, and he was sentenced 
to 153 months’ imprisonment.  Renteria now claims that the 
methamphetamine sent to Pennsylvania should not have been 
included in the calculation of his base offense level under the 
Guidelines.  He argues that without including the Pennsylvania 
shipment, his Guidelines range would have been 121 to 151 
months instead of 151 to 188 months. 
 
Because Renteria did not object to the Guidelines 
calculation at his sentencing, we review the District Court’s 
decision for plain error.38  Under the Guidelines, a defendant’s 
base offense level is calculated based, among other things, on 
                                              
37 Id. 
38 United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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“all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, 
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the 
defendant.”39 
 
In this case, Renteria directly participated in the 
transaction involving the methamphetamine shipped to 
Pennsylvania because he agreed to collect most of the money 
for such drugs when he met Kuc in California.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that it was not plain error for the District Court to 
determine that Renteria aided and/or abetted the transaction. 
Therefore, it was also not plain error for the District Court to 
include the shipped methamphetamine in its calculation of 
Renteria’s base offense level for sentencing.  We will affirm 
Renteria’s sentence.  
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt a 
reasonable foreseeability test to establish venue under 
§ 3237(a).  We therefore conclude that the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania was a proper venue for Renteria’s case and that 
the District Court’s jury instructions were proper.  We will also 
affirm Renteria’s sentence of 153 months’ imprisonment.  
                                              
39 Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). 
 
